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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Appellants are appealing only from that portion of the 
decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah filed 
September 10, 1987 which affirms the summary judgment in favor of 
defendant I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc. 
This was an appeal from an order granting summary judgment 
against the plaintiffs in that the statue of limitations barred 
the causes of action. 
In the opinion of the Supreme Court filed September 10, 
1987, the order granting summary judgment against Dr. Brown was 
reversed, but the court, being equally divided as to the 
plaintiffs claim against I.H.C, affirmed the summary judgment as 
to that defendant. The plaintiff's hysterectomy occurred October 
22, 1980 and hospitalization followed. In July of 1981, 
plaintiff Saundra Brower sought emergency medical treatment at 
Kanab hospital with blood clot problems arising out of an 
injection and puncture in her leg she received while in the 
hospital recovery room on October 22, 1980. 
Plaintiffs gave the 90 days statutory notice of intent on 
February 16, 1983 and filed their action June 14, 1984. 
Plaintiffs contend that the negligence of the hospital 
relative to the injection and puncture were not discovered until 
July 1981. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
While in the recovery room in October 1980 at the I.H.C. 
hospital in Cedar City, plaintiff Saundra Brower received some 
type of injection variously referred to as aflKlf shot or 
injection. She was not conscious at the time, but It was given 
while in the recovery room recovering from the hysterectomy. 
Plaintiff's sister and husband saw the amount of blood spurting 
from her thigh (deposition of Saundra Brower, pg. 94 lines 2-4). 
The Court in its opinion has reviewed the facts of the 
matter. 
The injection, whatever it was, was part of a "single 
package" treatment given to plaintiff. Plaintiff had no way of 
separating the injection from the other treatment received at the 
hands of her Doctor, Dr. Brown. She surrendered herself into 
the hands of Dr. Brown, who placed her in the hospital where the 
surgery was performed. Dr. Brown tended her through all of the 
proceedings. She had no way of knowing until July of 1981 that 
something was wrong in this "single package" course of treatment. 
Dr. Brown had been advised of the puncture wound, but did not 
respond. Plaintiff therefore, could only assume that it was part 
of the treatment for her illness and was not alerted to, nor 
became aware that anything was wrong, until the emergency 
hospital treatment in July of 1981 when she was advised of the 
negligence of whoever administered the injection to her. Nothing 
had happened prior to that time to lead her to believe that there 
was anything wrong other than the usual recovery problems. 
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The matter should have been treated as a single course of 
conduct or transaction; and the trier of fact should determine, 
as the legislature intended, whether the plaintiff knew or should 
have known at the time of the injection of the negligence of the 
defendant I.H.C. (Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-12-47 (1987). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN TREATED 
AS ONE TRANSACTION BY THE REVIEWING COURT. 
Since the legislature has established the method for 
determining cases of this type, as to whether the plaintiff has 
met the statue of limitations problem, the Court should have 
allowed the trier fact to determine the question to the statue of 
limitations. The procedure has been expressly set up by the
 i 
legislature for determination of when the Plaintiff should have 
discovered the injury (Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-12-47 (1987). 
An analogy can be drawn between the cases involving the < 
leaving of the broken surgical needles, sponges, and other 
foreign matters inside the body of a patient. The depositing of 
some material inside of a patient's body by injection is no < 
different than leaving of a sponge or some form of material 
inside a body. In one case, the body opening is closed up 
• ' " • • • • " " - ' < 
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In the Case of Ruth vs Dicrht. et. al. 75 Washington 2d 660, 
435 P. 2d 631 (Washington 1969), the Washington Supreme Court 
held that the statue of limitations commences to run when the 
patient discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care for his 
own health and welfare should have discovered the presence of a 
substance or article in his body. A surgical sponge was left in 
the patient's body. Some 20 years elapsed, until discovery of 
the sponge was made. During that period of time, the patient 
sought continued medical assistance, to no avail. In addition 
the patient had extreme pain and distress. 
There is no difference between a foreign object left in a 
body through surgical means after which the cavity if sutured and 
the placement of a foreign or harmful object or substance in the 
body by injection, or damage of interior body tissue, by needle. 
A small blood spurt per se from an injection certainly does not 
put the patient on notice of some impending problem within the 
body where the needle was injected. Especially, when inquiry had 
been made, but no response received from Dr. Brown. The 
plaintiff assumed by the lack of interest of the defendants that 
there was no problem, and that this was a normal, expected part 
of the whole transactional hysterectomy procedure. 
The Ruth Court, supra at pages 436, 437, stated, " Unless 
the legislature has acted affirmatively, the Court should attempt 
to strike a balance between harm to the person who would not in 
the usual course of events know he had been wronged until long 
after the statue of limitations had cut off his legal remedies, 
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or being deprived of remedy versus harm of being sued. . ." 
The Ruth Court also discussed the concepts of fundamental 
fairness and the common law purpose to provide a remedy for every 
genuine wrong. This latter overriding concept tempers our common 
law system, and the implementation of statutory law relative 
thereto. 
Hence, the hysterectomy hospitalization and events related 
thereto, while different causes of action should be treated as 
one single transaction, or course of conduct and the trier of 
fact should determine when the plaintiff knew or should have 
known of the negligence of I.H.C. 
There is no difference between the implantation into the 
body of some harmful or foreign substance, and leaving a foreign 
object in the body after surgery; conversely there is no 
difference between an injury to tissue or otherwise in a 
patient's body, created by a needle and an injury created 
negligently during surgery which is afterwards sutured. The 
patient could have an infected or bloody incision, and assume it 
is a normal part of the surgical process. 
POINT II 
THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE REVERSED THE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANT. 
The Supreme Court of Washington in the case of Ohler vs. 
Tecoma General Hospital, et. al 92 Wash 2d 507, 598 P. 2d 1358 
(Washington 1979), in a case involving administration of oxygen 
6 
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to a baby resulting subsequent blindness, held that in 
determining accrual of the cause of action, that all of the 
essential elements of the possible cause of action, towit, duty, 
breach, causation, and damages, must be "discovered" before the 
cause of action begins running. All essential elements of the 
possible cause of action should have reasonably been discovered 
by the patient before the cause of action occurs. In instant 
case, the plaintiff did not become aware of the duty of the 
health care provider, nor the breach of duty of the health care 
provider, nor was she aware of any damages, until July of 1981, 
which is within the statutory period. 
Should she have had notice of some complication because her 
husband and sister saw blood spurting from an injection. She 
relied upon the health care providers to notify her of any
 { 
problem thereby. She did discover the following year, in July 
1981, that there was a duty, that the duty had been breached, and 
that she was damaged, because of the complications of the
 { 
injection and/or puncture in her leg on October 22, 1980. 
( 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court should have 
reversed the order granting summary judgment as to defendant { 
I.H.C. and treated the entire course of conduct as one 
"transaction". There is no difference between an injurious 
"substance" left in the body from an injection or damage done by i 
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a needle in the course of an injection, and something left in the 
body during surgery. 
The trier fact should determine the question of the statue 
of limitations, as provided by the legislature, and the order 
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant I.H.C. be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
</^ no // / 
Russell A. Cannon 
Attorney at Law 
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7 
/ 
/f/l /%J ' £T> 
Russell A. Cannon 
Attorney at Law 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four true and 
correct copies of the forgoing, Petition for Rehearing of 
Appellants, Saundra and Frank Oscar Brower, postage prepaid this 
24th day of September, 1987, to: 
David W. Slagle 
Jody K. Burnett 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent Dr. David W. Brown 
Charles W. Dahlquist, II 
Norman J. Younker 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-
I.H.C. Hospitals INc, a corporation 
and I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc., a corporation 
doing business as Valley View Medical 
Center 
tfoYjOUYltUL. ^J^Lu/J 
Roxanne R. Richey j 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
